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Clinical evidence suggests that after initiation of dopaminergic medications some patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) develop
psychotic symptoms, such as hallucinations and delusions. Here, we tested the hypothesis that the neurocognitive basis of this
phenomenon can be defined as the formation of arbitrary and illusory associations between conditioned stimuli and reward signals, called
aberrant salience. Young, never-medicated PD patients and matched controls were assessed on a speeded reaction time task in which
the probe stimulus was preceded by conditioned stimuli that could signal monetary reward by color or shape. The patients and controls
were re-evaluated after 12 weeks during which the patients received a dopamine agonist (pramipexole or ropinirole). Results indicated
that dopamine agonists increased both adaptive and aberrant salience in PD patients, that is, formation of real and illusory associations
between conditioned stimuli and reward, respectively. This effect was present when associations were assessed by means of faster
responding after conditioned stimuli signaling reward (implicit salience) and overt rating of stimulus–reward links (explicit salience).
However, unusual feelings and experiences, which are subclinical manifestations of psychotic-like symptoms, were specifically related to
irrelevant and illusory stimulus–reward associations (aberrant salience) in PD patients receiving dopamine agonists. The learning of
relevant and real stimulus–reward associations (adaptive salience) was not related to unusual experiences. These results suggest that
dopamine agonists may increase psychotic-like experiences in young patients with PD, possibly by facilitating dopaminergic transmission
in the ventral striatum, which results in aberrant associations between conditioned stimuli and reward.
Neuropsychopharmacology (2012) 37, 950–958; doi:10.1038/npp.2011.278; published online 16 November 2011
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INTRODUCTION
Although dopaminergic deficit is a hallmark of Parkinson’s
disease (PD), loss of this neurotransmitter is not evenly
distributed in the striatum. Specifically, there is a more
pronounced reduction of dopamine in the dorsal than in the
ventral striatum (Kish et al, 1988). Therefore, therapies that
restore dopamine level in the dorsal striatum result in
dopamine ‘overdose’ in the ventral striatum, which may
lead to impaired performance on some cognitive tasks
(Gotham et al, 1988; Cools et al, 2001, 2003; Shohamy et al,
2006; Jahanshahi et al, 2010; MacDonald et al, 2011) and in
some cases psychotic symptoms, including hallucinations
and delusions (McGowan et al, 2004; Mehler-Wex et al,
2006; Maia and Frank, 2011). At the same time, there is
evidence that dopaminergic therapy enhances learning from
reward signals and decreases learning from punishment
signals in PD (Frank et al, 2004, 2007; Cools et al, 2006; Bo´di
et al, 2009; Graef et al, 2010; Kobayakawa et al, 2010), and
the ventral striatum has a crucial role in reinforcement
learning (Yin and Knowlton, 2006).
Conditioned stimuli associated with reward elicit phasic
dopamine release in the striatum relative to stimuli that fail
to predict reward (Schultz, 2007), which is important in
human reinforcement learning (Pessiglione et al, 2006). It
has also been shown that conditioned stimuli increase the
speed of responses, and this effect is mediated by
dopaminergic signals in the ventral striatum (Wyvell and
Berridge, 2000). This phenomenon is called motivational or
incentive salience, as a formerly neutral stimulus becomes
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associated with a motivational value that guides purposeful
behavior (Berridge, 2007). King et al (1984) postulated that
abnormal dopaminergic signals lead to chaotic and
arbitrary stimulus–reward associations, which may be
related to disorganized and psychotic behavior in some
PD patients receiving dopaminergic drugs. This hypothesis
of aberrant salience and the role of dopamine were
emphasized in the context of psychiatric disorders such as
schizophrenia (Kapur, 2003; Miller, 1993; Roiser et al, 2009;
Schmidt and Roiser, 2009; Shaner, 1999). Housden et al
(2010) suggested that excessive dopaminergic transmission
results in a strong preference for immediate over future
rewards in PD patients with impulsive-compulsive behav-
iors (eg, punding, hyper-sexuality, pathological gambling,
compulsive shopping, and binge eating), but its relationship
with psychotic-like symptoms is less clear.
Despite the rich theoretical background, no longitudinal
study has been performed to investigate the effect of
dopaminergic drugs on adaptive and aberrant salience in
patients with PD. To achieve this aim, we recruited young,
never-medicated patients with PD and matched healthy
controls. We followed up the patients after the initiation of
dopamine agonists (pramipexole and ropinirole) in order to
study the effect of these drugs on adaptive and aberrant
salience, and on subjective feelings and experiences related
to psychosis.
Participants completed a speeded reaction time task in
which the reward after the response was signaled by
conditioned stimuli preceding the probe stimulus (Figure 1)
(Roiser et al, 2009; Schmidt and Roiser, 2009).
We hypothesized that dopaminergic therapy increases
adaptive salience, and therefore patients will show a more
pronounced conditioning effect after initiation of dopami-
nergic medications. The critical question was how dopa-
mine agonists affect aberrant salience, that is, the effect of
task-irrelevant conditioned stimuli on responses and
subjective ratings of salience. We predicted that in the
therapeutic range pramipexole and ropinirole have no
significant effect on aberrant salience, given that the
majority of patients receiving this treatment do not develop
psychotic symptoms.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We recruited 20 newly diagnosed, young patients with
idiopathic PD who had never received dopaminergic
medications. Patients were diagnosed and assessed by
trained neurologists and psychiatrists who were naı¨ve to
the aim of the study. All patients met the UK Parkinson’s
Disease Society Brain Bank Clinical Diagnostic Criteria
(Hughes et al, 1992). The PD patients were compared with
20 matched healthy volunteers. After baseline testing in
unmedicated state, the patients started dopamine agonist
therapy and were followed up for 12 weeks (pramipexole:
n¼ 12, mean dose at follow-up: 4.0 mg/day, range: 2.0–
6.0 mg/day; ropinirole: n¼ 8, mean dose at follow-up:
8.5 mg/day, range: 4.0–11.5 mg/day). After this period,
participants were re-evaluated. The patients also scored
their overall subjective state using a 10 to + 10 Likert-type
scale (10: feeling very bad relative to the unmedicated
state; + 10: feeling very good relative to the unmedicated
state; 0: no changes after medication).
Neurological and psychiatric symptoms were assessed
using the Hoehn–Yahr Scale (Hoehn and Yahr, 1967), the
Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) (Lang
and Fahn, 1989), the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale
(HAM-D), the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HAM-A)
(Mountjoy and Roth, 1982), and the Young Mania Rating
Scale (YMRS) (Young et al, 1978). Impulsive-compulsive
spectrum behavior was evaluated according to standardized
criteria using structured interviews (Voon and Fox, 2007).
Socioeconomic status was characterized by the Hollings-
head Four-Factor Index (Cirino et al, 2002), and general
intellectual functions were measured using the revised
version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R)
(Wechsler, 1981). All scales were administered by trained
experts who were blind to diagnosis, test performance, and
medication status. The clinical and demographic data are
presented in Table 1. All participants gave written informed
consent and the study was approved by the institutional
ethics board.
Salience Attribution Test
Stimuli were generated and presented using a VPC221
workstation (ViewSonic, Walnut, CA). Participants were
asked to respond to a probe stimulus (a black square
appearing on the computer screen) as quickly as possible by
pressing a button. The probe stimulus was preceded by
conditioned stimuli (colored shapes) predicting the prob-
ability of reward after the response (Figure 1). At the
beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was presented. After
1 s the conditioned stimuli appeared at the top and bottom
part of the screen, and remained there until the end of the
trial. After an interval of 0.5–1.5 s, the probe stimulus
appeared on the screen and participants responded
(Figure 1).
The duration of the probe stimulus was calculated for
each participant during the training session preceding the
main test. The practice trials were similar to the main test
trials with the exception that conditioned stimuli were not
presented and no reward was provided. Participants were
Fixation
cross
Conditioned
stimuli Probe
+ + 50 pence
1 - 2 s1 s 2.5 s
Reward
Figure 1 The salience attribution test. Participants were asked to press
a button as quickly as possible when the probe stimulus (black square)
appeared on the computer screen. The probe was preceded by
conditioned stimuli that could signal reward. Either color or shape
predicted reward. For example, green signaled reward regardless of shape
(circle or triangle), and therefore shape was the task-irrelevant dimension.
Adaptive salience means that participants explicitly rate reward more likely
and implicitly respond faster when conditioned stimuli predicting reward
precede the probe (eg, color green). In the case of aberrant salience, a
similar phenomenon can be observed for the task-irrelevant stimulus
dimension (eg, faster responses in the case of circle relative to triangle
despite the fact that shape did not predict reward). In this case, association
between conditioned stimuli and reward is illusory and not based on real
contingencies.
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simply asked to respond as quickly as possible when the
probe stimulus appeared on the screen. At the beginning of
the first practice session, the probe was exposed with
variable durations (0.5–1.5 s, mean: 1 s). Feedback was
provided after 2 s (‘Good’Fresponses before disappearance
of the probe; ‘Try to respond faster’Fresponses after
disappearance of the probe; ‘Too early’Fresponses before
appearance of the probe). In the second practice session, the
probe stimulus duration was set according to individual
reaction time. We calculated the SD of the mean reaction
time from the faster half of the trials for each participant.
The mean probe stimulus duration was the mean reaction
time from the first practice session. The maximum and
minimum probe stimulus duration was calculated by
adding or subtracting twice of the SD (mean reaction time
+ /2SD). In the main test, the mean, minimum, and
maximum probe stimulus durations were calculated from
the data obtained from the second practice session.
The main test consisted of 100 trials (Figure 1). Reward
(winning money) was delivered after 50% of trials. The
likelihood of reward was signaled by the conditioned
stimuli, which varied on two dimensions: color (green or
red) and shape (circle or triangle). One of these dimensions
was task-relevant. For example, one of the colors predicted
reward on 40 out of the 50 trials (80%) (eg, green circle and
green triangle), whereas the other color signaled reward
only on 10 out of the 50 trials (20%) (eg, red circle and red
triangle). The other dimension was task-irrelevant, so that
25 out of 50 trials (50%) were rewarded for both types of
stimuli (circle and triangle). Color and form did not differ
regarding effectiveness of reward prediction, that is, there
were no significant differences between conditions when
color or form was the task-relevant dimension (p40.5).
On reinforced trials, participants won between 5 and 100
pence (exchanged to Hungarian Forints) depending on the
latency of the response. On reinforced trials when
participants made premature or late responses, they got
5 pence. If participants made a correct response (pressing
the button after the onset but before the offset of the probe),
the magnitude of the reward depended on the speed of the
response:
RM ¼ 10 þ 90ðRT½training  RT½trialÞ=3SD
RM: reward magnitude; RT (training): mean reaction time
from the second training session; RT (trial): actual reaction
time from the main test; SD: standard deviation of the mean
reaction time from the faster half of the trials in the second
training session.
The money was added to the total points of the
participant, which was presented at the top of the screen.
At the end of the test, participants were asked to indicate
how they estimated the reward probability for each
conditioned stimulus by clicking on a 10-cm visual analog
scale presented on the computer screen.
The current version of the test shows some differences
compared with the paradigm of Roiser et al (2009). We used
more simple conditioned stimuli without semantic proper-
ties, the number of blocks was different, and there were
fewer trials. The main reason is that we intended to simplify
and shorten the test to make it easier for patients who are
less able or willing to stay on tasks.
Table 1 Clinical and Demographic Characteristics of Participants
Controls Parkinson’s
patients
Number of participants (male/female) 20 (14/6) 20 (14/6)
Age (years) 46.3 (7.9) 45.8 (6.0)
Education (years) 14.2 (6.3) 14.3 (7.0)
Time since onset of first
symptoms (months)
F 20.3 (9.6)
Full-scale IQ (WAIS-R) 109.6 (10.5) 107.4 (12.9)
Socioeconomic status (Hollingshead) 37.9 (15.2) 38.5 (16.9)
No. of patients in Hoehn–Yahr stage F 1.0: 3
1.5: 2
2: 14
2.5: 1
UPDRS total
Baseline F 34.4 (9.8)
Follow-up F 26.7 (8.8)a
UPDRS III (motor)
Baseline F 25.5 (6.4)
Follow-up F 20.5 (7.5)b
HAM-D
Baseline 3.7 (3.3) 3.9 (2.2)
Follow-up 3.7 (2.9) 3.8 (2.3)
HAM-A
Baseline 3.0 (2.5) 3.4 (1.9)
Follow-up 3.1 (2.7) 3.4 (2.0)
YMRS
Baseline 1.0 (0–2) 1.0 (0–4)
Follow-up 1.0 (0–2) 2.5 (0–8)c
O-LIFE unusual experiences
Baseline 9.0 (3.5) 8.5 (3.0)
Follow-up 8.9 (3.3) 11.6 (3.3)d
Cognitive disorganization
Baseline 9.1 (4.0) 8.9 (4.2)
Follow-up 9.1 (4.1) 8.6 (4.2)
Introvertive anhedonia
Baseline 4.7 (2.6) 4.8 (3.7)
Follow-up 4.9 (2.8) 4.0 (3.3)
Impulsive nonconformity
Baseline 7.6 (4.4) 6.9 (4.5)
Follow-up 7.2 (4.7) 7.1 (4.6)
Abbreviations: HAM-A, Hamilton Anxiety Scale; HAM-D, Hamilton Depression
Scale; O-LIFE, Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; UPDRS,
Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale; WAIS-R, Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale, revised; YMRS, Young Mania Rating Scale.
Data are mean (SD) with the exception of YMRS where median and range are
depicted.
at(38)¼ 2.62, p¼ 0.01.
bt(38)¼ 2.27, p¼ 0.03.
cZ¼2.18, p¼ 0.03.
dt(38)¼3.06, p¼ 0.004.
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Implicit and explicit adaptive and aberrant salience can
be characterized by reaction time and visual analog scale
scores, respectively. Implicit adaptive salience is the
difference between the reaction time on trials with low
reward probability and that on trials with high reward
probability collapsed across the task-irrelevant stimulus
dimension. Larger differences indicate speeded responding
on trials with high reward probability, which refers to
implicit adaptive salience. Explicit adaptive salience is
defined as the increase in rating on the visual analog scale
for trials with high reward probability relative to trials with
low reward probability collapsed across the task-irrelevant
stimulus dimension.
Implicit and explicit aberrant salience are calculated in a
similar way, but in this case reaction time and visual analog
scale scores are determined by using the task-irrelevant
stimulus dimension collapsed across the task-relevant
stimulus dimension. Aberrant salience could be any
deviation from equal reaction time or equal visual analog
rating for the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension. In the
case of each individual, ‘high’ and ‘low’ reward probability
levels are determined according to the subjective response;
‘high’ is the type of irrelevant stimulus dimension to which
the participant responded faster or rated higher on the
visual analog scale (eg, responding faster or giving higher
rates to red shapes as predicting reward despite the fact that
color was the irrelevant dimension). Therefore, reward-
predictive value has no absolute meaning in the context of
the irrelevant stimulus dimension (the ‘high’ level of the
factor is always higher than the ‘low’ level of the factor by
definition). A perfect rational learner would show zero
aberrant salience.
In the data analysis, the dependent measures were reaction
time, visual analog rating scores, and salience values.
Assessment of Feelings and Experiences Related to
Psychosis
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experi-
ences (O-LIFE; Mason et al, 1995) questionnaire was used to
assess everyday versions of feelings and experiences related
to psychotic states. The instrument consists of 159 items
with a dichotomous response format. O-LIFE measures four
dimensions: Unusual Experiences (perceptual aberrations,
magical thinking, and hallucinatory experiences), Introver-
tive Anhedonia (decreased pleasure and enjoyment from
social and physical sources of pleasure, and avoidance of
intimacy), Cognitive Disorganization (loosened association
and poor concentration), and Impulsive Nonconformity
(impulsive, eccentric, aggressive, and asocial traits).
Data Analysis
The STATISTICA 9.1 software (StatSoft, Tulsa) was used for
data analysis. Normality of data distribution was checked
with Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. Levene’s tests were used to
check the homogeneity of variance. Repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to compare
PD patients and controls on the salience attribution test,
and to evaluate the effect of dopamine agonists at follow-up.
The ANOVA was followed by Tukey Honestly Significant
Difference (HSD) tests. Two-tailed t-tests were used for
analysis of demographic data and scores on clinical scales.
If the data violated normal distribution, Mann–Whitney
U-tests were used. Pearson’s product–moment correlation
coefficients were calculated between salience attribution test
variables and behavioral scales. The level of significance was
set at ao0.05.
RESULTS
General Description of the Sample
The clinical and demographic data are presented in Table 1.
There were no significant differences between patients
and controls regarding age, education, IQ, social-economic
status, mood and anxiety, and baseline O-LIFE scores
(p40.5). At the follow-up phase, the UPDRS scores
were lower relative to the baseline. There was a slight
but statistically significant increase in YMRS and O-LIFE
unusual experiences scores in PD patients after initiation
of dopamine agonist therapy (Table 1). Overall, the
patients reported that at the follow-up phase their general
subjective state was better than before therapy (mean: 5.4,
SD¼ 3.4).
Reaction Time from the Salience Attribution Test
We tested how medication affected reaction time on the
salience test in patients with PD. For the relevant stimulus
dimension, we conducted an ANOVA in which group
(controls vs PD) was the between-subject factor, and testing
time (baseline vs follow-up) and reward-predictive value of
conditioned stimulus (high vs low) were the within-subject
factors.
This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
predictive value (F(1,38)¼ 38.55, po0.0001). There were
significant two-way interactions between testing time and
group (F(1,38)¼ 17.61, p¼ 0.0002), and between testing
time and predictive value (F(1,38)¼ 12.30, p¼ 0.001).
Critically, we found a significant three-way interaction
among group, testing time, and predictive value
(F(1,38)¼ 24.81, po0.0001). All remaining main effects
and interactions were not significant (Fo3, p40.05).
Post hoc tests indicated that in healthy controls reaction
time was faster when the probe stimulus was preceded by
conditioned stimuli with high predictive value relative to
that with low predictive value (po0.05). However, this
effect was present in PD patients only at follow-up testing
when they received dopamine agonists (po0.001), but not
in the unmedicated state (p40.5) (Figure 2). We also found
that dopamine agonists decreased reaction time in patients
with PD under the high-predicting condition (po0.001) but
not under the low-predicting condition (p¼ 0.9). Controls
showed similar values at both testing times (p40.5)
(Figure 2).
For the irrelevant stimulus dimension, we conducted an
ANOVA in which group (controls vs PD) was the between-
subject factor and testing time (baseline vs follow-up) was
the within-subject factor. Reward-predictive value was not
included in this analysis because it is hardly interpretable in
the context of irrelevant stimulus dimension (by definition
the ‘high’ stimulus will be associated with higher explicit
rating and shorter reaction time than the ‘low’ stimulus).
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This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of testing
time (F(2,37)¼ 7.89, p¼ 0.002), and a two-way interaction
between group and testing time (F(2,37)¼ 7.53, p¼ 0.002).
Post hoc tests indicated that PD patient showed shorter
reaction time at follow-up testing relative to baseline
(po0.001) (Figure 2).
Explicit Rating from the Salience Attribution Test
We also investigated how medication affected explicit rating
on the salience test in patients with PD. For the task-
relevant condition, we conducted an ANOVA in which
group (controls vs PD) was the between-subject factor, and
testing time (baseline vs follow-up) and reward-predictive
value of conditioned stimuli (high vs low) were the within-
subject factors.
The ANOVA indicated significant main effects of group
(F(1,38)¼ 32.26, po0.0001), testing time (F(1,38)¼ 6.10,
p¼ 0.02), and predictive value (F(1,38)¼ 83.68, po0.0001).
There were two-way interactions between group and testing
time (F(1,38)¼ 6.09, p¼ 0.02), and group and predictive
value (F(1,38)¼ 9.63, p¼ 0.004). The three-way interaction
among group, testing time, and predictive value was
significant (F(1,38)¼ 5.03, p¼ 0.03). All other results from
the ANOVA were non-significant (Fo3, p40.05).
Post hoc tests indicated that dopamine agonists increased
explicit rating scores in PD patients, but this effect was
selective for high-predicting stimuli (po0.01). At baseline
testing, PD patients showed lower rating scores for high-
predicting stimuli relative to controls (po0.001). This
difference remained significant at follow-up testing, but its
magnitude was smaller (po0.05). In the case of low-
predicting stimuli, we did not observe differences between
PD patients and controls, and controls showed similar
values at both testing times (p40.5) (Figure 3).
For the irrelevant stimulus dimension, we conducted an
ANOVA in which group (controls vs PD) was the between-
subject factor and testing time (baseline vs follow-up) was
the within-subject factor. There was a significant main effect
of testing time (F(2,37)¼ 10.39, po0.001). The interaction
between group and testing time was also significant
(F(2,37)¼ 11.50, p¼ 0.0001).
According to the post hoc comparisons, PD patients
showed a significantly increased rating score at follow-up
testing relative to baseline (po0.001). Moreover, in the
medicated state they showed higher rating scores relative to
controls (po0.01) (Figure 3).
Adaptive and Aberrant Salience Scores
Table 2 shows adaptive and aberrant salience values
calculated from reaction time (implicit salience) and visual
analog rating scores (explicit salience). Table 3 presents the
result from the ANOVAs and post hoc tests conducted on
these salience scores. Overall, dopamine agonists increased
all types of salience in PD (baseline vs follow-up compar-
ison), whereas values from the controls group showed
stability in time.
Premature Responses and Omissions
There were no significant differences between PD patients
and controls, or between testing sessions (baseline vs
follow-up) (p40.5) (Table 2).
Relationship between Salience and Subjective
Experiences Related to Psychosis
In unmedicated patients with PD, there were no significant
correlations among salience test measures and O-LIFE
scores (0.34r40.3). By contrast, in PD patients receiving
dopamine agonists, faster reaction time and higher
subjective rating for task-irrelevant stimuli were associated
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with increased scores on the O-LIFE unusual experiences
dimension obtained in the medicated state (reaction
time: r¼0.65, po0.005; rating: r¼ 0.57, po0.05). Reac-
tion time and subjective rating for task-relevant stimuli
did not correlate with O-LIFE scores (ro0.1). The changes
in aberrant salience scores and the change in O-LIFE
(baseline vs follow-up) were not significantly correlated
(ro0.2).
Finally, in controls we did not find a significant relation-
ship between salience test measures and O-LIFE scores
(0.34r40.3). Salience test results did not correlate with
the YMRS scores (ro0.1).
Effects of Gender and Medication Type
There were no significant differences between male and
female patients (p40.5). Patients receiving pramipexole or
ropinirole did not differ in salience test and O-LIFE scores
(p40.1) (Figure 4). The dose of dopamine agonists did not
correlate with these measures (0.2oro0.2).
DISCUSSION
Clinical studies suggest that psychotic symptoms are more
frequent in PD patients receiving dopaminergic drugs than
it was thought before (Weintraub and Burn, 2011). The
severity and type of these symptoms depend on the
duration and type of medication, the cognitive status of
the patients, and pre-existing psychopathology (Ecker et al,
2009; Stoner et al, 2009; Verbaan et al, 2009). However, it
has not been investigated whether dopamine agonists shift
subjective feelings toward psychotic-like experiences in
young, previously never-medicated patients with PD, and
how these unusual experiences are related to reward
learning. Here, we showed that dopamine agonists facilitate
not only adaptive and real stimulus–reward associations,
but the emergence of illusory and arbitrary associations
(aberrant salience). Importantly, faster reaction time and
higher subjective rating for task-irrelevant stimuli, char-
acterizing aberrant salience, correlated with sub-threshold
psychotic-like feelings and experiences in PD patients
Table 2 Salience Scores, Premature Responses, and Omissions
Measure Parkinson’s patients (n¼20) Controls (n¼20)
Baseline Follow-up Baseline Follow-up
Implicit adaptive salience 4.7 (24.5) 53.2 (27.8) 24.3 (36.8) 16.5 (32.7)
Implicit aberrant salience 4.0 (10.4) 46.3 (47.3) 15.5 (16.1) 11.3 (33.8)
Explicit adaptive salience 10.1 (20.4) 23.5 (21.5) 34.3 (21.0) 33.2 (17.1)
Explicit aberrant salience 6.4 (21.3) 28.0 (19.8) 10.9 (13.9) 10.3 (13.3)
Premature responses 2.3 (2.8) 2.6 (3.1) 2.5 (3.5) 3.4 (3.0)
Omissions 1.2 (1.9) 0.9 (1.5) 1.1 (1.7) 1.3 (2.0)
Data are mean (SD). Adaptive salience represents faster responding (implicit) or higher rating (explicit) for high reward predicting trials relative to low reward
predicting trials. In the implicit condition adaptive salience is calculated as: mean reaction time on low reward predicting trials minus mean reaction time on high reward
predicting trials. In the explicit condition adaptive salience is calculated as: visual analog rating scores on high reward predicting trials minus visual analog rating scores on
low reward predicting trials. Implicit and explicit aberrant salience is calculated in a similar way, but in this case reaction time and visual analog scale measures are
determined using the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension collapsed across the task-relevant stimulus dimension.
Table 3 Summary of ANOVA Results Conducted on Salience Scores
Main effect
of group
Main effect of
testing time
Group by testing
time interaction
Post hoc comparison
F p F p F p
Implicit adaptive salience 1.18 0.28 12.98 0.001 24.81 o0.001 PD[med]4PD[base]
PD[med]4CONT[base, follow]
PD[base]¼CONT[base]¼CONT[follow]
Implicit aberrant salience 2.56 0.12 9.2 0.004 13.77 0.001 PD[med]4PD[base]
PD[med]4CONT[base, follow]
PD[base]¼CONT[base]¼CONT[follow]
Explicit adaptive salience 9.63 0.004 3.72 0.06 5.03 0.03 PD[med]4PD[base]
PD[med]¼CONT[base, follow]
PD[base]oCONT[base]¼CONT[follow]
Explicit aberrant salience 1.77 0.19 20.23 o0.001 22.61 o0.001 PD[med]4PD[base]
PD[med]4CONT[base, follow]
PD[base]¼CONT[base]¼CONT[follow]
Abbreviations: [base], unmedicated baseline; CONT, controls; [follow], re-tested at follow-up without medication (controls); [med], medicated at follow-up;
PD, Parkinson’s disease.
Post hoc comparisons: Tukey HSD, po0.05.
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receiving dopamine agonists, which is against our initial
hypothesis that in the therapeutic range these drugs are free
from such effects. Moreover, after dopamine agonist
administration PD patients showed higher scores relative
to controls in the case of task-irrelevant but not in task-
relevant stimulus ratings, suggesting that information
processing was biased toward aberrant salience (Figure 3).
This effect was confirmed by aberrant salience scores
(Tables 2 and 3).
However, it is essential to emphasize that none of the
patients showed clinical psychosis, and the increase in
unusual experiences after administration of dopamine
agonists was moderate (27%). The subjective well-being
of the patients was increased after initiation of the
therapy. Nevertheless, it is likely that patients who show
marked unusual experiences are at higher risk for clinical
psychosis. Independent from the salience scores, dopamine
agonists also induced a slight increase in manic-like
symptoms, as reflected by higher YMRS scores at the
follow-up assessment.
Consistent with our results, Roiser et al (2009) showed
that psychotic patients with delusions showed significantly
greater aberrant salience than those without delusions.
Intriguingly, in the study by Roiser et al (2009) aberrant
salience also correlated with negative symptoms and O-LIFE
introvertive anhedonia (reduced interest and social
withdrawal). The authors interpreted this seemingly para-
dox phenomenon as a consequence of an abnormally high
false-negative phasic dopamine signal. Specifically, Knutson
et al (2004) demonstrated that amphetamine unexpectedly
decreased the magnitude of phasic ventral striatal responses
in response to conditioned stimuli predicting reward (false
negatives), which could result in decreased motivational
salience, leading to loss of volition and interest. On the
other hand, however, amphetamine caused phasic ventral
striatal activation for conditioned stimuli that did not
predict reward (false positives), which may be related to
aberrant salience.
Our results demonstrate that dopamine agonists may
have a different effect compared with amphetamine, which
releases dopamine from synaptic terminals; dopamine
agonists increased both adaptive and aberrant stimulus–
reward associations, possibly by stimulation of D2 and D3
dopamine receptors in the ventral striatum (Gerlach et al,
2003; Winstanley et al, 2011). Indeed, the ventral striatum is
implicated in general motivational salience, together with
other key structures, including the midbrain dopaminergic
centers and the prefrontal cortex (Roiser et al, 2010).
Dopamine agonists may modulate the activation of this
complex network (Ishibashi et al, 2011; Ye et al, 2011).
The effect of dopamine agonists may be a double-edged
sword, as increased adaptive salience may improve activity
and motivation, whereas aberrant salience may increase the
risk of psychotic symptoms. Dopaminergic drugs also
enhance memory for angry faces in PD (Subramanian
et al, 2010), as well as action–effect binding, which is
implicated in the subjective experience of controlling one’s
own actions (Moore et al, 2010). Enhanced representation
of anger may contribute to paranoid ideations, leading to
false interpretations of social signals (Kosaka et al, 2002),
and the altered sense of controlling one’s own actions may
be also related to psychotic experiences, such as disrupted
feeling of agency (Voss et al, 2010).
Cools et al (2010a) showed that attention was captured by
bottom-up salient information to a greater extent in PD
patients relative to healthy controls (but see also Mannan
et al, 2008). Low dopamine levels in the striatum, together
with potentially higher frontal dopamine levels, may
contribute to increased resistance to distracting information
in PD (Cools et al, 2010b). However, dopaminergic
medication restores the balance between striatal and
prefrontal dopamine levels, and hence may increase
distractibility by bottom-up information, which can be
interpreted as a form of enhanced salience. If this effect is
exaggerated, distractibility may increase psychosis vulner-
ability. The prefrontal cortex is especially important in
aberrant salience: participants who showed greater aberrant
salience were characterized by enhanced prefrontal
responses (Roiser et al, 2010). Dopamine agonists change
value sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex and may impair
negative reinforcement (van Eimeren et al, 2009). Further
studies are needed to directly investigate the relationship
between dopaminergic mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex
and the striatum in the context of adaptive and aberrant
salience.
The results of the present study extend the findings of
Housden et al (2010) who investigated salience in chronic
PD patients receiving both L-DOPA and dopamine agonists.
These authors demonstrated that PD patients without
impulsive-compulsive behavior showed impaired learning
in the case of stimuli predicting reward with high
120
140
160
80
100
20
40
60
Im
pl
ici
t S
al
ie
nc
e 
(m
s)
PramipexoleRopinirole
0
70
80
40
50
60
10
20
30
Ex
pl
ici
t S
al
ie
nc
e 
(m
m)
Adaptive
Aberrant
0
Figure 4 Scatterplot of explicit and implicit salience in patients with PD
receiving ropinirole and pramipexole.
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probability, but PD patients with impulsive-compulsive
behavior were able to learn such stimulus–reward associa-
tions. They did not find enhanced explicit aberrant salience,
which was demonstrated in our medicated PD patients.
Housden et al (2010) did not find significant correlation
between O-LIFE unusual experiences and aberrant salience;
instead, introvertive anhedonia was positively correlated
with explicit aberrant salience and cognitive disorganization
was positively correlated with implicit aberrant salience
when all participants were included in the analysis. The
correlation between implicit aberrant salience and cognitive
disorganization may highlight another aspect of psychotic-
like phenomena compared with unusual experiences. It is
important that all PD patients showed higher O-LIFE
unusual experiences and cognitive disorganization scores
relative to controls, which was even more pronounced in PD
patients with impulsive-compulsive symptoms who showed
greater schizotypy on each O-LIFE dimension (Housden
et al, 2010).
There are several differences between the study of
Housden et al (2010) and the present investigation,
including task structure (type of reward-predicting stimuli
and number of experimental blocks) and the clinical
characteristics of participants. In contrast to the patients
of Housden et al (2010), we assessed young, never-
medicated patients with marked motor symptoms but short
disease duration before and after dopamine agonist
monotherapy, and our patients showed no impulsive-
compulsive symptoms, depression, and anxiety.
Our study has two major limitations. First, healthy
controls did not receive dopamine agonists, and therefore
it remains to be elucidated whether the effect is specific for
PD or not. Second, medication effects may be confounded
by session order, given that dopamine agonist therapy
always followed the unmedicated baseline testing. However,
the finding that healthy controls did not show session
effects suggests that the results are related to medications.
In conclusion, our findings have implications for both
basic and clinical neuroscience. First, we demonstrated that
dopamine agonists do not selectively enhance adaptive
reward learning, but increase general salience signals
leading to illusory and aberrant stimulus–reward associa-
tions. Second, our data highlight the importance of
monitoring of subclinical psychotic-like feelings and
experiences in patients receiving dopamine agonists in
order to detect vulnerable persons and to prevent the
development of clinical psychosis.
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